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THE PRACTICE OF FAITH
Martin S. Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
" 'ONSTITUTIONAL meaning," observes Bruce Ackerman, "is
'
1
..,,not fueled by the intellectual curiosity of a juristic elite, but by
crucial historical events which provoke popular efforts to modify,
sometimes radically, pre-existing starting points .... ." True to this
premise, Professor Ackerman has spent the better part of the last dec-
ade attempting a "narrative reconstruction"' of those historical events
that have been most crucial.3 Lately he has, both here and elsewhere,
excoriated we, today's "generation of midgets," for ignorantly be-
traying the achievements hard won by "We the People" of the New
Deal generation.4 For Ackerman, constitutional history not only mat-
ters, it is, and ought to be dispositive-at least, that is, until a later
generation itself makes constitutional history on a similar scale.
For all his distinctiveness and for all his protestations, Ackerman
merely raises, in acute form, an increasing concern for our constitu-
tional past in general. If this Symposium is any indication, many if not
most of the constitutional theories now competing for attention assign
a significant role to history in ways far more genuine and sophisticated
than the caricatured appeals to the past made by Judge Bork- or Ed-
win Meese.6 Lawrence Lessig, for example, whose efforts have made
the term "fidelity" stylish, clearly means fidelity-faithfulness--to a
given principle set down at a given point in our constitutional history
to be given life today through intelligent "translation."7 This "fidel-
ity" Symposium, moreover, does appear to be an indication. In her
recent, comprehensive, and elegant survey of postwar constitutional
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. B.A., Princeton University, 1981;
M.A., Yale University, 1982; M.Phil., Yale University, 1987; J.D., Columbia Law
School, 1988. I would like to thank Mark Tushnet and the Georgetown Biennial Dis-
cussion Group on Constitutional Law for the opportunity to present an earlier version
of this piece. Thanks as well to Mfinna Jung and Ed Shapiro for valuable research
assistance.
1. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1519, 1519
(1997) [hereinafter Ackerman, Generation of Betrayal.
2. Id. at 1536.
3. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter Acker-
man, Foundations].
4. Ackerman, Generation of Betrayal, supra note 1, at 1528; Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations chs. 9-13 (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Ackerman,
Transformations].
5. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990).
6. Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in Interpreting the Constitution
13, 13-21 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990)
7. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365, 1366-67
(1997).
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theory, Laura Kalman places special emphasis on what she calls, "the
turn to history" as one of the most important recent trends in constitu-
tional thought.'
With a predictable lag, the recent turn to history is only now
prompting the hard questions of how this should be done. For a time,
constitutional theorists interested in history followed the advice Earl
Weaver gave to Dennis Martinez about pitching and simply proceeded
to do it 9 rather than worry about sound methods for doing so. This
approach, moreover, has its defenders among theorists and even his-
torians. Yet it has become more and more apparent that, unlike Den-
nis Martinez, the turn to history has too often resulted in history that
is at best "lite"'10 or at worst, just plain "bad."" As a result, just doing
it is giving way to the concern for standards. What those standards
should be, however, is another matter.
This Response takes this occasion to develop the argument that
lawyers who make historical assertions should rely on historians.
Seemingly mundane, this position has generated little resistance ex-
cept among the legal audience to whom it is addressed 2 -one reason
for expanding the point further.' 3 Part I looks in greater depth at the
dependence of theory, any theory, on history and the problems that
result. Part II attempts to demonstrate that reliance on historians mit-
igates these difficulties more effectively than any other plausible ap-
proach. This Response concludes that while more rigorous attention
to the past may not resolve raging interpretive debates, it could not
fail to improve what medieval theologians in another context termed
the "practice of faith."
I. THE PAST AS PROLOGUE
This conclusion assumes that the past will be useful in coming to
terms with the larger conflict. Many would agree that this assumption
seems safe, though few might agree why. To rule out at least one pos-
sibility at the outset, the past itself cannot justify guidance by the past.
8. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Liberal Constitutionalism ch. 5. (1996)
[hereinafter Kalman, Liberal Constitutionalism].
9. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1773
(1987).
10. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History Lite]; see also Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People/s1, Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 147 & n.150 (1996) (citing Flaherty, History Lite, supra); Mark
Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-In-Law, 71 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 909, 925 & n.68 (1996) (same) [hereinafter Tushnet, History-In-Law].
11. See Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 3, at 91, 334-35 n.21.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
13. Recent response to earlier versions of my argument have generated sufficient
response, in print and informally, that I leave for another day developing the theme of
"Constitutional Erosion" that I spoke to at the Symposium itself. See infra text ac-
companying notes 47-48.
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As Ronald Dworkin points out, it is circular to argue that the views of
the Founders, for example, must bind later generations simply because
the Founders themselves thought their views should be binding. 4 In-
stead, the past's theoretical relevance to constitutional interpretation
must come from theory. The problem of how far the past ought to
bind the present is another matter. Yet few if any theorists contend
that the past is irrelevant. To the contrary, many if not most agree
that it is significant, even essential.
The most obvious devotion to past issues comes from those who err
on the side of democracy. For a wide array of intentionalist thinkers,
the keys to the great constitutional mysteries can be discovered in the
views of the Founders. Sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly,
intentionalists justify their reliance on this particular history with
some variant of Hamilton's famous passage in Federalist No. 78. Be-
cause the "people" articulate constitutional law, and subsequent gen-
erations govern themselves within the framework of that law, those
generations must consult the "people's" views when determining what
the original framework leaves open-unless of course one of those
subsequent generations itself successfully claims to act for "the peo-
ple" and changes the framework. 15
Originalists take this argument to its most extreme conclusion,
holding that the historical understandings initially underlying constitu-
tional norms are dispositive. Unfortunately those who gave this ap-
proach its current name have also given it a bad name. As has by now
been oft-noted, originalists such as Meese, Bork, Scalia, and Thomas
almost always, suspiciously, come up with original understandings that
are narrow applications rather than broad principles.' 6 Even more
suspiciously, these narrow applications, in turn, almost always lead to
conservative results in modem political terms. On this view, for ex-
ample, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause could never pro-
14. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 33, 53-55 (1985). This is not to say
that the Founders in fact thought any such thing. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985). But see Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77,79
(1988) (arguing that "although the originators rejected the use of framer intent, they
did not thereby envisage that Constitutional interpretation would exclude considera-
tion of original intent").
15. The Federalist No. 78, at 527-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). This is not to say that all of these ideas necessarily result from Hamilton's
treatment.
16. These criticisms come in addition to numerous theoretical objections. Initialmanifestoes either assumed that original understanding ought to be binding, see, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CAn. L Rev. 849, 862 (1989) (stat-
ing that the purpose of Constitutional guarantees is to prevent the law from reflecting
changes in original values), or, fell prey to Dworkin's objection with the circular claim
that original understanding ought to bind because such was the original understand-
ing, see, e.g., Bork, supra note 5 at 143-85, 251-59 (discussing the significance of origi-
nal understanding).
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hibit disproportionate prison sentences,' 7 nor the Fourteenth
Amendment protect a right to die,' 8 nor the Establishment Clause
prevent government aid to religion in general' 9 -all on the ground
that the original understanding ostensibly demonstrates a commit-
ment to contemporaneous practices at odds with such results.
Yet not all originalists, including ones often termed conservative,
appear so unrelentingly simplistic or suspicious. Consider Michael
McConnell. McConnell clearly defends originalism both in concept
and name.20 He does not, however, commit the error of invariably
equating original understanding with original application .2  To the
contrary, he sagely observes that a historical search for original under-
standing often may fail to produce a clear answer even on an abstract
level.' Not surprisingly this insight does not always yield politically
conservative-or at least retrograde-results. Recently, for example,
he has argued that the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not foreclose applying "equal protection" to public
education today.23
Not everyone who does this sort of thing even employs the term
originalism, particularly modern liberals. Here return to Ackerman.
The more one ponders dualist theory, the harder it becomes to distin-
guish it from the approach claimed, if not practiced, by Antonin
Scalia. Put aside disputes about particular original understandings or
even the exclusivity of Article V. To say that constitutional meaning is
fueled primarily by crucial historical events' 4 is all but indistinguish-
able from asserting that the way "to establish the meaning of the Con-
stitution [is] ... by examining various evidence, including not only, of
course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also
the contemporaneous understanding."'  Dualist originalism, how-
ever, will never be confused with applications. And despite a common
17. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J.).
18. Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Catholic University, LEXIS Counsel Connect,
Hot Topics File (Oct. 1996).
19. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1269 (1997).
21. Id. at 1284.
22. Id. at 1284-87.
23. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va.
L. Rev. 947 (1995). Perhaps ironically, this particular conclusion has not escaped criti-
cism from the left on grounds of historical method. Tushnet, History-In-Law, supra
note 10, at 917-25. In general, though, McConnell's methods stand out for their ex-
tensive reliance on an array of primary and secondary sources. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1511 (1990) (concluding that interpretation of free exercise
clause which mandates religious exemptions was contemplated by the framers); see
also infra text accompanying notes 51-63.
24. See Ackerman, Generation of Betrayal, supra note 1.
25. Scalia, supra note 16, at 852.
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criticism, Ackerman's theory will generate political results often at
considerable odds with his own theory of justice, as he is quick to
point out.26
Yet originalists are not distinctive for their appeals to the past, only
the weight they place upon it. An array of other thinkers---call them
historicists 27-may not view particular accounts of the Founding or
Reconstruction as dispositive, but still consider them as authoritative,
privileged, or highly probative. Count among this group such impor-
tant thinkers as Lawrence Lessig, Akhil Amar, Cass Sunstein, and
Richard Epstein. Whatever their considerable differences each theo-
fist typically bolsters their prescriptions with historical assertions, al-
beit often to considerably different degrees. Even Dworkin, who may
not always have done as he has said in this regard,28 places what is for
him a novel premium on the historical context of constitutional text.
Now, officially in his "later" incarnation, Dworkin makes strikingly
direct appeals to history in the service of what he terms "linguistic
intent. 2
9
Reliance on the past also figures heavily in those theories that err
on the side of rights and justice. The past that rights-oriented ap-
proaches typically invoke, however, is less the history underlying par-
ticular constitutional texts than the evolving traditions that shape our
constitutional culture.3" As with intentionalist reliance on history, jus-
tifications for invoking tradition are also often left unstated. Of those
who do articulate a rationale, some rest on some democratic founda-
tion.3' For others, tradition appears to matter out of a concern for
feasibility, that is, for determining which rights the society sufficiently
honors (even in the breach) to be candidates for judicial protection
26. Ackerman, Generation of Betrayal, supra note 1, at *902-03.
27. Cf. Robert W. Gordon, Historicism and Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale LJ. 1017
(1981) (asserting that "historicism" is not intended to describe the view that meanings
be exclusively derived by reference to a unique time and place).
28. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L Rev.
1335 (1997).
29. Ronald Dworkin, Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law 8 (Sept. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
30. Tradition in this sense can predate constitutional texts by centuries-think of
Justice Frankfurter's invocations of English law-and continue well beyond them.
Nowhere is reliance on tradition more evident than in the Supreme Court's substan-
tive due process jurisprudence, where tradition continues to play a dominant role in
the definition of fundamental rights. See e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847-49 (1992).
31. Perhaps the most well known instance of a democratic justification for a
rights-based approach is Justice Brennan's reliance on evolving tradition as a means
to maintain the people's "ongoing consent" to our constitutional order, including the
work of the Supreme Court. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, in Interpreting the Constitution, supra note 6, at
23, 23-34.
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and which are not.32 Accordingly, some theorists contend that the
ideas of the Founders should matter because they were unusually able
thinkers, with a wealth of practical experience, facing problems that
endure.3 3 Others simply believe that history matters because we can-
not intelligently develop new norms without comprehending old
ones.34 Here Dworkin, arguably in a more familiar "early" mode,
counsels understanding history and tradition by positing "fit" to our
constitutional culture and past as a basic criterion of legitimacy.35
So heavy is "the weight of the dead hand of the past" that Christo-
pher Eisgruber makes the intriguing observation that it is less to be
consulted than, if not resisted, at least regulated.36 Taken as a norma-
tive claim, this suggestion hardly advocates abandoning history alto-
gether-as Eisgruber's own work amply demonstrates.3 7 To the
contrary, as a descriptive insight, Eisgruber's observation suggests that
considering the past when considering the Constitution simply cannot
be avoided.
Too often, though, the resulting attempts to identify either history
or tradition-to borrow a technical phrase from Bruce Ackerman-
stink.38 For all that various theories esteem the past, the actual esti-
mation remains in the strictest sense theoretical, at least as far as his-
torians would be concerned.39 In part the law's shoddy use of the past
simply reflects the difficulties of interdisciplinary exchange. Histori-
ans seek explanations while lawyers make arguments, and from this
basic distinction a host of more specific methodological differences
flow. In particular, most legal academics lack the perspective, time,
32. This idea is not confined to the identification of rights. Perhaps the most artic-
ulate defense for reliance on tradition comes from Larry Kramer, who counsels invok-
ing evolving practice as a source of constitutional authority in such structural areas as
federalism and separation of powers. Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And
Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1638-41 (1997).
33. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 856-59 (1995).
34. Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 33 (1989).
35. Dworkin, supra note 14, at 143-45.
36. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past. History and Constitu-
tional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1617 (1997).
37. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const.
Commentary 37 (1993) (discussing the historical significance of the Dred Scott deci-
sion in modem substantive due process analysis); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Four-
teenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 47, 47-48 (1995) (identifying the
shifting impact that historical events can have on constitutional interpretation).
38. Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 3, at 170.
39. Documenting this assertion would be more tedious than challenging. Suffice it
to say that the task is best left to other venues. See Mark Tushnet, Red, White and
Blue 23-45 (1988) [hereinafter Tushnet, Red, White and Blue]; Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1745-55 (1996); Flaherty, History
Lite, supra note 10, at 524-28.
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and knowledge of sources to pursue historical study particularly
well.40
Perhaps even higher interdisciplinary hurdles result from impera-
tives inherent in constitutional discourse in particular. Those commit-
ted to democratic, intentionalist approaches often succumb to the
temptation of cooking the record precisely because such approaches
make the stakes of defining the record so high. Conversely, those who
are more directly rights-oriented often sidestep any real inquiry into
the past altogether perhaps, one suspects, because the messiness that
such an inquiry usually yields inevitably does violence to neat, theo-
retical constructs.41
Should constitutional theorists, then, forget the whole thing? The
sorry record might well tempt one to say as much. And in fact it has
prompted a number of theorists to conclude the legal community
should simply employ historical arguments as just one more polemical
technique 42-which from a historian's vantage point is much the same
as forgetting the whole thing.
Defenders of this result advance a number of justifications, ranging
from traditional to postmodem. The most venerable of these starts
with the problem of competing accounts. Advanced by such scholars
as Mark Thshnet,43 the argument goes that the historical disagreement
evident in law reviews is no stranger to history books either, and each
case demonstrates that widespread accord, much less consensus, on a
single interpretation of a given event is a chimera. It follows that any-
one arguing for a particular constitutional position should feel per-
fectly free to choose that version of constitutional history that
provides the best support, or better still, tailor one to size.
Lately, a more popular rationale issues from a fairly formalistic
commitment to modem university departments, otherwise known as
interpretive communities. The potent roster for this view includes
Tushnet,4 Cass Sunstein,4s and Stanley Fish.4 This group argues that
40. See Flaherty, History Lite, supra note 10, at 526 n.16. Laura Kalman appar-
ently-and reasonably-took an earlier version of this argument to be that members
of the legal community cannot pursue history credibly. With this contention she dis-
agrees. Kalman, Liberal Constitutionalism, supra note 8, at 168-71. Instead, my point
is merely that the cultural incentives of the law and legal education make the enter-
prise difficult in itself, and significantly more difficult than it is for professional histori-
ans. On this point I hope that our disagreement, if any, is considerably more narrow.
41. A case in point, as noted, is Dworkin, whose pronouncements about the value
of fit have yet to yield corresponding attempts to discern fit to much beyond recent,
and selected, Supreme Court precedents.
42. Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 Colum. L Rev. 601, 601-02
(1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Usable Past]; Tushnet, History-In-Law, supra note 10, at
932-35.
43. See .ishnet, Red, White and Blue, supra note 39, at 23-45.
44. Mark lbshnet, Constituting We the People, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1557 (1997).
45. Sunstein, Usable Past, supra note 42, at 605.
46. Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness (1996).
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lawyers and historians look to the past with different goals and should
therefore not be judged by the same criteria. While historians attempt
to reconstruct the past, lawyers seek to create narratives that have
self-consciously normative implications. "On this view," argues Sun-
stein, "the historically-minded lawyer need not be thought to be doing
a second-rate or debased version of what the professional historians
do well, but is working in a quite different tradition with overlapping
but distinct criteria."47 As Tushnet concisely puts the point, "Law-
office history is a legal practice, not a historical one. The criteria for
evaluating it, for determining what is a successful performance, must
be drawn from legal practice rather than from historical practice. 48
Potentially the most interesting justification for conceiving history
as rhetoric springs from the problem of historical revisionism. This
argument has yet to gain currency in law reviews though it is more
familiar among historians themselves. On this view, the law's at-
tempts to invoke the past may flounder not simply because lawyers
appear ill-equipped to do it or because they need not do it except as it
benefits a particular position. Rather, the entire enterprise may be
doomed to failure because no one, not even the most careful historian,
is in a position to do it. TWo versions seem worth raising for present
purposes. The more radical critique holds that the past is almost en-
tirely a construct of the present. On this view neither history nor tra-
dition can provide meaningful constraints because interpreting the
past, like all interpretation, turns on the conditioning, desires, and
whims of the interpreter. A more modest, yet still sweeping, chal-
lenge contends that while the past can yield certain constraints, it does
not provide enough to matter. In particular, even those interpreta-
tions based on the most rigorous study only rarely provide genuine
guidance, and then usually fall to the revisionist accounts of later gen-
erations anyhow.
Either way, and really in all of these ways, the best that any of us
can do in the end is make virtue of necessity. Rather than chase for
historical truth, we must admit that the only real criterion for a consti-
tutional lawyer's use of the past should not be whether a given event
ever happened but whether it convinces anybody to go the lawyer's
way.4 9
II. PAST PLAUSIBLE
Before resorting to that, it may be that the enterprise can still be
saved upon further consideration. It may be that such consideration
will actually lead to methods that permit constitutional thinkers to use
47. Sunstein, Usable Past, supra note 42, at 605.
48. 'Tushnet, History-In-Law, supra note 10, at 934-35.
49. For a description of postmodern challenges to history, see Joyce Appleby et
al., Telling the Truth About History 198-237 (1994).
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the past credibly rather than just forensically. It may also be, finally,
that such methods can withstand current challenges, whether tradi-
tional or postmodern. In each regard the bottom line will be reliance
on historical standards as employed by historians, which will in turn
mean relying on historians themselves to an extent only rarely at-
tempted in the legal community. To paraphrase Brandeis, the best
way to combat poor history is more history.
Just as there is no formula for maintaining fidelity to the past, still
less is there an algorithm for the prior question of figuring out what
those past instructions, or traditions, are. Though only recently con-
sidered in the pages of law reviews, certain ways of making assertions
about the past are clearly better than others. These logically come
from the discipline of history itself. This conclusion follows not so
much because historians determine what is historically true,50 but be-
cause they commonly resolve what is historically convincing. Legal
arguments relying on economics, philosophy, or sociology are more
convincing when they comport with the standards set by those disci-
plines. Nothing prevents the same point from applying to arguments
based upon history.
To the contrary, the logic of using the past compels it. Constitu-
tional theorists do not ordinarily cite Madison, Hamilton, or Wilson
simply because these thinkers had compelling ideas. Instead, they in-
yoke them for authority that derives from something external to the
substance of their thought, namely for the fact that their ideas arose in
a certain time and place that directly connects them to our constitu-
tional history and tradition. Seeking such external authority entails
playing by external rules. Or at least it entails playing by external
rules until it came be shown, as postmodernists claim they can, that
the external rules themselves do not provide the authority that they
promise.
Ultimately-and this rightly makes lawyers nervous-reliance on
historical standards means reliance on historians. In part those stan-
dards involve too much drudgery for most in the legal academy to
attempt. In part those standards themselves dictate turning to estab-
lished scholarship, at least initially.
Jack Rakove, both in these pages51 and in his exemplary book enti-
tled Original Meanings,5 2 helps demonstrate why. Taking originalism
50. Whether a matter can be deemed historically "true" in an objective sense need
not be resolved to assert the utility of historical standards. For a discussion on histori-
cal objectivity, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and
the American Historical Profession (1988) and Thomas Haskil, Objectivity Is Not
Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practic4 in That Noble Dream, History and Theory (Peter
Novick ed., 1990).
51. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 Fordham L Rev. 1587
(1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Fidelity Through History].
52. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution (1996).
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in particular as "a problem of historical recovery with legal implica-
tions, 53 Rakove posits four broad categories of evidence that may be
brought to bear when attempting to uncover the original understand-
ing, meaning, or intention of a constitutional provision. First come the
notes collected in Max Farrand's The Record of the Federal Conven-
tion, 4 along with a small number of background papers such as im-
portant letters and memoranda by James Madison. In addition, a
good historian would have to look at the more diffuse and voluminous
records surrounding the state ratification conventions. 5 Rakove does
not believe that either of these basically "textual"56 sources would at
first blush present insurmountable problems to a legal community
that, after all, is trained to work with texts. What the historian does
not point out, however, is that a thorough examination of just these
first two types of sources would probably press most lawyers further
than they might want to go. Nor, as Rakove aptly notes, is the usual
shortcut of relying on The Federalist a reliable way oUt.5 7
Yet the real work begins with Rakove's remaining categories, which
he terms "contextual. 5 8 One is "the general heading of those intel-
lectual sources of influence that shaped the mental world of the revo-
lutionary generation... [including, among others] ... Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, Hume . . . Blackstone ... Grotius, Puffendorf, and
Delolme. '' 59 Still one more source essential for any inquiry into con-
stitutional origins is perhaps most demanding of all-"the habits, atti-
tudes, lessons, and concerns that Americans derived from their own
political experiences. '60
Consider these strictures applied. Gordon Wood, for example,
noted that he began his epic Creation of the American Republic
simply with the intention of writing a monographic analysis of con-
stitution-making in the Revolutionary era; yet I soon found that I
could make little or no sense of the various institutional or other
devices written into the constitutions until I understood the assump-
tions from which the constitution-makers acted. I [therefore]
needed ... to steep myself in the political literature of the period
61
53. Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 51, at 1594.
54. Yale reprinted the original three 1911 volumes in 1987, together with a forth
volume of documents assembled by James Hutson. Max Farrand, The Record of the
Federal Convention (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
55. See Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 51, at 1597-1600.
56. Id at 1600.
57. Idt at 1597. For more on the use and abuse of The Federalist, see Flaherty,
History Lite, supra note 10, at 553-54 & n.137.
58. Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 51, at 1595.
59. Id at 1598.
60. Idt at 1599.
61. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 vii-viii
(1969).
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Doing this, like most other standards historians attempt to live by, is
immensely labor intensive. A historian would take years steeping her-
self in the relevant sources before venturing forth with any authorita-
tive overview of even the most modest event, much less one as
momentous as the Founding. Forrest McDonald, for instance, at least
implies he did Wood one better by refusing to generalize about the
Founding until he had, "read virtually every line of virtually every ex-
tant American newspaper for the period and a large body of personal
correspondence," among other things.6
As if all this were not enough, neither McDonald, Wood, Rakove
nor any other respected historian goes forward without also according
the same type of scrutiny to yet another type of source, namely, the
work of fellow scholars.63 In doing this, historians are especially on
the lookout for either accounts that their colleagues more or less gen-
erally agree upon or, failing that, at least a framework for further de-
bate and research. Most scholars seek a dominant account or
framework to follow, to build upon the information and interpretation
of those who have spent lifetimes in a particular field to better focus
upon outstanding questions and locate the answers in a meaningful
context. A select few also master the current paradigms to expose
their weaknesses and debunk them.
Paradoxically, the problems that these standards present to the
legal community also generate their own solution. Legal scholars, and
still less practitioners, do not have the luxury of "steeping" themselves
in a given period. Cases and controversies rage here and now; tenta-
tive answers must be advanced. Against these odds, the professionals
who serve the law cannot possibly hope to meet the standards of their
counterparts who serve history (no more, perhaps, than Jack Rakove
could argue a case before the Supreme Court). They can, however,
rely on those who do. Much like historians themselves, constitutional
professionals can at least look to prevailing historical accounts or de-
bates when trying to resolve specific issues. While this is also time
consuming, reading one or two dozen of the acknowledged leading
books on a topic beats reading the thousands of sources that the au-
thors of those books had to consult. Yet doing this, especially in the
legal context, does not sacrifice historical credibility. Following these
rules, by definition, comports with the external standards through
which the legal community seeks external guidance. In fact, this prac-
tice seems to be the only practical hope.64
62. Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum The Intellectual Origins of the
Constitution 67 n.25 (1985).
63. See Id. at 313-41; Wood, supra note 61, at 619-33.
64. One example of someone who does this economically is Abner S. Greene,
Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chli. L. Rev. 123
(1994). Another scholar who has embarked on a more full-fledged excursion into the
past in order to explore federalism is Larry Kramer. See Larry Kramer, Understand-
ing Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 (1994).
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In the first instance, practice of this sort goes a long way toward
addressing the problem of competing accounts. Interestingly, some of
the same scholars who argue that widespread agreement on crucial
events is rare, themselves display a command of historical scholarship
to expose the chronic failings of their colleagues.65 Put more directly,
they demonstrate how the past can be credibly pursued in asserting
that it cannot. Many chronic failings, moreover, seem readily correct-
able with just a modicum of additional homework. It just is not the
case, for example, that we need throw up our hands about the initial
public understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's evident textual
centerpiece, the Privileges or Immunities Clause. True, one historian,
Robert Kaczorowski, asserts that the Clause was initially read broadly
while another, Raoul Berger, contends that it was meant to be viewed
as especially contentious.66 A little more time on the database, how-
ever, would quickly reveal that while legal historians respect the for-
mer scholar, they have time and again challenged both the conclusions
and methods of the latter.67 At least on the practical level, perhaps we
should not give up too hastily.
Then again, maybe not hastily, but ultimately nevertheless. That, at
any rate, is the challenge put forward by those who in essence argue
that the standards of historians need not apply to theorists because
historians are historians and theorists are theorists.68
The premise of relying on sound historical standards, however, is
the very reason why the legal community appeals to history in the first
place. For most theorists most of the time, the whole point of invok-
ing history is either implicitly or explicitly to seek authority external to
the theory being put forward. When, for example, Cass Sunstein
claims that the Founding generation was primarily "republican," he
does so not just because those republican ideals remain convincing on
their own terms, but because the historical fact that this group of peo-
ple practiced these ideals at a certain place and time add something to
his theory of constitutional interpretation that logic, originality, and
reason cannot themselves supply, however powerful or otherwise con-
vincing. 69 Such additional authority has at least two facets, which
might broadly be termed postmodern and modern. For the more fash-
ionable set, the appeal to another discipline augments a theoretical
65. See Tushnet, Red, White and Blue, supra note 39, at 36 (1988).
66. Compare Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863 (1986) (reading the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause broadly) with Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary
(1977) (emphasizing the puzzlement that historical figures share over the meaning of
the clause).
67. For two solos in an unforgiving chorus, see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453,523 n.139 (1989); John J. Gibbons, Book
Review, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 839 (1978).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
69. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 17, 24 (1993).
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truth-claim with a truth-claim from that outside discipline, rendering
the claim that much more potent. For the less newfangled crowd, a
theoretical claim drawing on history in particular makes a theoretical
point additionally attractive by grounding it in experience, or for the
truly old-fashioned, in some form of reality.
Either way, once a historical appeal becomes nothing more than a
trope, it falls prey to an inevitable dilemma. To the extent it serves as
a postmodem appeal to another craft, it must abide by that craft or
lose its authority. To the extent it functions as an assertion of fact or
something close, it must rely on some verifiable source beyond rhetor-
ical power or lose that authority. Now it could be argued that all of
this is harmless error so long as the legal audience is unfamiliar with
the accepted conventions for making a credible historical point.Y° But
this contention appears to be little more than a defense for misrepre-
sentation. Pushed to the extreme, it takes the form of something like
a made-up quotation from James Madison ("the best republican gov-
ernment ever witnessed has been the military rule of Oliver Crom-
well"), never mind that historians don't do this sort of thing, or that it
simply never happened, so long as it will convince the legal commu-
nity. Yet this type of argument cannot work given the premise that
theorists make historical arguments to gain additional authority. So
long as this is true, it follows that Madison extolling military dictator-
ship either does not deliver the goods from a separate discipline or
ground the. theoretical point in fact, as the very gesture of making the
assertion advertises. The second facet of the problem, moreover, goes
beyond false advertising. Even if this matter goes undetected, a the-
ory relying on truly deficient accounts of what people say and do must
ultimately run into problems, at least if it hopes to have some connec-
tion to human behavior.7 If this is on the right track, then the only
way to restore power to the trope or greater reliability to a theory is to
rely on historians.
But if so, it is a hope that also seems easy prey for an even more
fundamental, postmodern set of objections. Consider the following
dilemma. Under the proposed approach, anyone hoping to interpret
the Constitution by examining its origins has no credible choice but to
rely in the first instance on historical scholarship, doubly so when a
recognized body of scholarship offers a provisional account or frame-
work. Fifty years ago that would have meant turning to the economic
70. Cf Tushnet, History-in-Law, supra note 10, at 934-35 (arguing that combining
law and history is a legal practice, not a historical method).
71. Hamilton put this thought elegantly, and prophetically, in a letter to Lafayette
about the French Revolution: "And I dread the reveries of your Philosophic politi-
cians who appear in the moment to have great influence and who being mere specu-
latists may aim at more refinement than suits either with human nature or the
composition of your Nation." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to the Marquis de
Lafayette (Oct. 6, 1789) in 5 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 425 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob Cooke, eds. 1962).
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interpretations of Charles Beard, whose model dominated histori-
ographical discourse for decades. 7 Today the initial choice would be
the very different narrative offered by Rakove, Wood, McDonald,
Bailyn, and Edmund Morgan. Fifty years from now it will probably be
an account-if there is a single account at all-crafted by scholars
with very different sounding names. Surely such turnover exposes the
fallacy of looking to the past for guidance. The constant shifts in the
accounts that even professional historians create confirms that neither
history nor tradition offer any real outside constraints for those who
occupy the present. At the very least it demonstrates that whatever
does limit historiographical creativity does not limit it much. Those
meager limits permit successive generations to reinvent the past even
when there has been temporary agreement on a dominant framework,
and that leaves anyone who would rely on any momentary paradigm
with little more than a rope of sand. Trying to salvage the past, it
appears, merely exposes the project's futility.
But a claim is not over 'till it's over. Further reflection suggests that
the past can come out of the encounter not only unscathed, but
stronger. The more radical challenge simply proves far too much.
The more modest objection, moreover, actually complements the use
of historical scholarship precisely because such scholarship changes.
Take the more radical objection. The shift from Beard to Wood (to
someone perhaps only now in high school) demonstrates the strength
of the constraints that operate upon historians rather than their malle-
ability. The "Beardian view" went out of fashion for many reasons,
but one of the most important was the discovery that Beard's thesis
simply could not comport with newly accessible sources and more rig-
orous research. In particular, McDonald led the way-in fact made
his reputation-in showing that wealthy creditors did not support the
Constitution, nor did embattled debtors oppose it, with anything like
the consistency Beard posited.73 Now a postmodern critique might
retort that the sources McDonald used to refute Beard are themselves
malleable. And on a deeper level that may well be true. But that is
not the level upon which people operate. Even the most cynical
originalist stands willing to concede a point when a relevant source
cuts directly against her.74 No less important, accepting such radical
indeterminacy for historical sources necessarily compels accepting the
72. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (1913).
73. Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution
(1958).
74. Or, to employ the pronoun descriptively, him. This phenomenon may explain
why Justice Scalia, for example, is curiously silent in those areas where he has reason
to believe that the weight of historical scholarship is against him. Compare Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (relying extensively on idiosyn-
cratic versions of English and American history) with Employment Division v. Smith
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (not relying on history at all).
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same type of indeterminacy for other materials that have been more
easily manipulated, such as cryptic constitutional text.
By contrast, the turnover of historical models does support the
more moderate postmodern challenge, but this turns out to actually
support following such models, or at least the most current version.
Only a dinosaur of the most Whiggish sort would argue that history is
a dispassionate search for truth, immune from the forces in which his-
torians live. Beard's progressive views flourished while he was speak-
ing to a society influenced by the Progressive movement. Wood's
ideological interpretations arguably first came to dominate because
his work first addressed an era steeped in the ideological competition
of the Sixties and the Cold War. Future historians will perhaps de-
velop a multicultural framework to connect with the nation's growing
pluralist and multicultural concerns.
Yet far from undermining the integrity of these models, this ele-
ment of contingency furnishes all the more reason to employ them.
As three pragmatic historians recently put it, "Successive generations
of scholars do not so much revise historical knowledge as they reinvest
it with contemporary interest .... New versions of old narratives are
not arbitrary exercises of historical imagination, but the consequence
of the changing interest from cumulative social experience."7 5 Con-
temporary historians formulate questions and approaches that, at
some level, reflect the concerns of the society in which they live. So,
too, do contemporary constitutional interpreters. Following a current
historiographical framework, therefore, speaks to present day consti-
tutionalists in a way that no previous or future account could. For
now, it is better historical practice to rely on Wood rather than Beard
(or, say, Foner rather than Fairman) not just because Wood's account
brings us closer to an objective reality, though something like that is
for most intents and purposes true. It is also better because the issues
Beard pursued-class warfare, economic determinism, elitist mis-
rule-at best engage our own concerns tangentially and sometimes
not at all.
CONCLUSION
Assuming any of this is on the right track, resolving how those who
aim to interpret the Constitution can plausibly use the past, in turn,
raises a host of problems that are no less difficult, maybe more so.
Supposing a useable account can be developed, just how should it be
used? Should it be dispositive, as originalists hold; presumptive, as a
historicist might argue; or merely probative, as justice-seeking theo-
rists commonly imply? And if the past should have some weight, how
precisely should the norms it offers be identified and isolated, how can
they be isolated and translated to often radically different circum-
75. Appleby, et al, supra note 49, at 265.
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stances, and how can they be reconciled with norms that arise from
subsequent periods? In one sense, each of these questions is itself
simply another facet of the larger quest to resolve competing claims
of, among other things, democratic will and reasoned judgment. At
least on one point, however, both will and judgment appear to concur:
it is best to take these matters one facet at a time.
